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Understanding Institutional-based Trust Building Processes in 
Inter-organizational Relationships 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper deals with the role of institutions in the development of trust in relationships between 
organizations. We review various strands of literature on organizational trust and examine the 
assumptions made about how trust building processes are influenced by institutional 
arrangements. Following this conceptual analysis, we discuss four mechanisms that are pivotal in 
the development of institutional-based trust. We also examine four situations where the influence 
of institutions can be particularly conducive to building trust. Finally, we argue that each of the 
situations calls for specific mechanisms to be predominantly employed in order to effectively 
create trust in inter-organizational relationships. 
 
Keywords: trust, trust building, institutions, institutional-based trust, inter-organizational 
relationships 
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Introduction 
Trust has become a central concept in explaining business behaviour in organizational contexts. 
The ability to create trust has widely been recognized as hugely valuable because it can 
significantly reduce transaction costs and lead to the creation of new ideas, for example when 
knowledge is pooled in inter-organizational relationships. In recent years, many studies have 
examined the conditions and variables that influence the creation of organizational trust (e.g. 
Nooteboom 2002; Möllering 2006, to name just two monographs which dig into these issues). 
Meanwhile, there is a growing collective understanding of what are to be seen as the key areas 
within trust research. These areas, among others, include trust and innovation, trust and 
contracts, trust and competitiveness, and trust and institutions (Bachmann and Zaheer 2006). 
However, the role of trust in (vertical and horizontal) business relationships seems to be, 
conceptually as well as in empirical terms, so complex that many questions still need to be asked 
and answers pieced together before we can speak of a fully consolidated research field within 
management studies. 
In this paper we seek to deepen our understanding of the relationship between trust and 
institutions in that we specifically examine how and when institutions matter with regard to trust 
building. Arguably, this is one of the least understood areas within trust research. At the same 
time, however, it seems most urgent to gain profound insights into the building of institutional-
based trust in the current global financial crisis. Institutional-based trust is badly needed when 
strategies are developed to re-build individuals’ and organizations’ trust in banks and other firms 
which have recently massively failed to live up to their business partners’ as well as other 
stakeholders’ expectations. The enduring global financial crisis is above all a trust crisis and 
demands solutions for repairing trust in business relationships by employing macro-level 
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approaches. Clearly, the problem has not emerged in that trust has broken down at the micro-
level, i.e. in relationships where individuals know each other face-to-face. The trust crisis is 
essentially due to a breakdown of macro-level trust, i.e. trust in (large) organizations. This is why 
we urgently need to know more about the development, repair, reach and potential of 
institutional-based trust. Some lessons may be learned from micro-level efforts to repair trust 
which is meanwhile a fairly well understood area (e.g. Kim et al. 2004; Kim et al. 2006). 
However, these insights have only a limited capacity to capture the core of the problem. Thus, a 
macro-level approach is needed and the concept of institutional-based trust seems key to 
developing viable strategies to overcome the current trust crisis. 
The reason why we have not yet progressed further in analyzing the role of institutions in 
trust building processes may have to do with the fact that the phenomenon of institutional-based 
trust does not enjoy undivided interest in the research community. Substantial parts of the trust 
literature assume that the development of trust is essentially a micro-level phenomenon based on 
frequent contacts between individual actors (i.e. trustors and trustees) and that institutions, if at 
all, play no significant role in trust building processes. These approaches conceptualize trust as a 
psychological phenomenon. Trust is described as an attitude, or ‘state of mind’, that an 
individual develops over time in the face of experiences with other relevant individual actors (see 
e.g. Rousseau et al.’s influential definition (1998), or Mayer, Davis and Schoormann’s well 
known conceptualizations of trust (1995)). When a psychological perspective is employed, 
however, macro-level factors such as institutions are usually not recognized as important to the 
development and the quality of the relationships between two actors (see e.g. many contributions 
in Kramer and Tyler (1996)) or in the trust-targeting special issues of several management 
journals in recent years, including Academy of Management Review in 1998 and 2009). In these 
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predominantly micro-level contributions to trust research, institutions, if mentioned at all, tend to 
be seen merely as external factors that perhaps have the capacity to disturb individuals’ relations, 
for example between a sales and a purchasing manager in a supplier relationship, but not as a 
constitutive part of the relationship and thus only of limited relevance with regard to trust 
building processes. In this perspective, the analysis of institutions appears as an issue that is to be 
separated from the concept of trust and as a mechanism which might even be understood as an 
alternative way to manage uncertainty in inter-organizational relationships.  
In our view, this approach is far too narrow. We think that macro-level analyses are 
important in trust research and that institutional-based trust deserves more attention in business 
contexts as advanced socio-economic systems can hardly rely on interaction-based forms of trust 
creation alone. The latter requires repeated face-to-face contacts and is thus usually very time-
consuming and – economically speaking – not always very efficient. In contrast, where 
institutional trust exists, both parties refer to institutional safeguards in their decisions and 
actions and can thus develop trust without having any prior personal experience in dealing with 
one another. Zucker (1986) has shown in her historical studies in the US-American socio-
economic system of the 19th and early 20th centuries that institutional forms of behavioural 
coordination and control, such as institutional-based trust, are essential if the function of trust in 
inter-organizational relationships in differentiated modern business systems is to be understood. 
In Zucker’s as well as in our view, institutional-based trust is a very important distinct form of 
trust (development) which necessarily involves macro-level arrangements and can only to some 
extent be captured by insights transferred from interaction-based trust, i.e. trust built on the basis 
of repeated face-to-face contacts. 
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 Zucker’s work is by no means the only important research contribution on the macro 
aspects of trust. A number of other scholars’ efforts, typically oriented around sociological 
theory, should not be overlooked. Even if they are not representing the mainstream of trust 
research they build the basis for our subsequent discussion (see Child and Möllering 2003; 
Hagen and Choe 1998; Misztal 1996; a number of contributions in Lane and Bachmann 1998; 
and in the 2001 special issue of Organization Studies on trust). Concepts such as ‘system trust’ 
(Giddens 1990; Luhmann 1979), which are in essence very similar to the notion of institutional-
based trust, are referred to in this strand of the literature and a number of scholars confirm that 
institutions do have a very crucial influence on trust building processes in inter-organizational 
relationships. From their point of view, trust is conceptualized as an ‘organizing principle’ 
(McEvily et al. 2003) or an efficient means to coordinate expectations and interaction 
(Bachmann 2001) in relationships between individual actors (i.e. managers) and/or collective 
actors (i.e. organizations), and not as an attitude or state of mind of an individual. The 
characteristics of the institutional environment in which interactions are embedded are viewed as 
constitutive elements in trust development processes in inter-organizational relationships.  
The latter perspective, in our view, is very important and fruitful in terms of theory 
building and the development of practically relevant management knowledge, not least with 
regard to trust building and trust repair strategies. However, this perspective has by far not been 
exploited in its explanatory potential yet. Our argument developed in this article takes on the 
challenge to fill this gap. It builds on this more sociologically grounded approach to inter-
organizational trust and, in so doing, aims to considerably deepen existing insights in the role of 
institutions in trust building processes. This, in our view, is crucial in the context of building and 
repairing trust in business partners after numerous examples of large-scale fraud (Enron, 
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Worldcom, Parmalat etc.) and irresponsible behaviours (by many bankers and governments) that 
have shaken the business world so dramatically in recent years. In order to restore trust, which is 
vital for the functioning of differentiated modern socio-economic systems, approaches which 
only target the micro-level and call for ethical behaviour by individual managers seem not 
sufficient. Rather, institutional-level interventions appear necessary to overcome the current trust 
crisis. This is why we urgently need to understand how exactly institutions do their job in the 
context of trust building, and when they matter the most. 
In this paper we analyse the relationship between institutions and trust creation by 
investigating two key issues. First, we examine the mechanisms through which institutions 
produce trust. Second, we discuss common managerial situations in which strong and reliable 
institutions are particularly relevant to trust development. In more detail, our paper is organized 
as follows: after the introduction, our understanding of (institutional-based) trust in 
organizational research is recapitulated. We then look at the approaches that are offered by 
general sociological theory to understanding the nature and function of institutions. A brief 
review of two literatures specifically dealing with institutional impacts on business relationships, 
namely the neo-institutionalist and the national business systems approaches, follows. We 
examine what these two approaches contribute to answering the question of how and when 
institutions matter with regard to trust building and trust repair (the latter being seen as a specific 
subtype of trust building processes). We then discuss the basic social mechanisms through which 
institutions produce trust and the situations in which institutions are specifically important. The 
following section suggests that a specific type of situation requires (a) specific dominant 
mechanism(s) to effectively produce institutional-based trust in business relationships. A 
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summary of the key points of our argument and some suggestions for how to successfully steer 
through the rough waters of the current trust crisis are presented in the conclusion of this article. 
 
What do Organizational Scholars Mean by (Institutional-based) Trust? 
 
Trust between individual and/or collective actors is based on the decision of one party to rely on 
another party under conditions of risk. The trustor permits his or her fate to be determined by the 
trustee and risks that he or she will experience negative outcomes, i.e. injury or loss, if the trustee 
proves untrustworthy (March and Shapira 1987; Sitkin and Pablo 1992). Although attitudes and 
dispositions are often viewed as the essential substrate of trust in the psychologically, i.e. micro-
level oriented literature, it is – from our point view – the action taken which follows the trustor’s 
decision to invest trust in a relationship that actually shows the existence of trust between two 
actors. Through a ‘leap of faith’ (Möllering 2006) trust transforms fuzzy uncertainty (where 
anything is possible) into the specific assessable risk (of betrayal) that a trustor is prepared to 
accept (Bachmann 2001) and thus creates opportunities for interaction which might otherwise 
not exist.   
 Trust in the form of interaction-based trust develops on the basis of personal face-to-face 
experience between two (or more) individuals without references made or being necessary to 
make to institutional arrangements. The psychological view emphasizes this mode of trust 
production. By contrast, institutional-based trust is a form of individual or collective action that 
is constitutively embedded in the institutional environment in which a relationship is placed, 
building on favourable assumptions about the trustee’s future behaviour vis-à-vis such 
conditions. This is what the sociological view on trust highlights and what we refer to when we 
say ‘institutional-based trust’. 
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In this context, it is important to note that in some parts of the literature institutional-
based trust denotes trust in institutions (where institutions, like for example the law, are the 
object of trust) but more often, and this is also our view, the concept of institutional-based trust 
refers to the phenomenon that individuals or collective actors develop trust in the face of specific 
institutional arrangements in the business environment. Here, we agree with the notion that trust 
in institutions, which is sometimes also referred to as societal trust (Barber 1983; Fukuyama 
1995; Sztompka 1999), is not seldom a vital precondition of trust developed between firms 
and/or managers vis-à-vis powerful and reliable institutions (Child and Möllering 2003).  
 Trusting someone builds on a decision which is based on an assessment of the other 
party’s competence, integrity and benevolence (Currall 1992; Sako 1992; Mayer et al. 1995), as 
well as a rough and quick semi-conscious assessment of the unrecoverable costs that would 
occur if the other party turned out to be untrustworthy (Bachmann 2001). These assessments can, 
in the case of interaction-based trust, build on experiences made with a potential trustee in 
repeated face-to-face encounters. However, such first-hand personal experiences are not always 
possible or desirable. In the case that the trustor and the trustee do not know each other, a third 
actor known to and trusted by the first two actors may function as a ‘third-party guarantor’ and 
thus play an essential role in trust development (Coleman 1990; Shapiro 1987). The third-party 
guarantor does his or her job in that he or she provides an overlap of both parties’, i.e. the 
trustor’s and the trustee’s, explicit and tacit knowledge domains, and allows for judgments on 
part of the (potential) trustor that would not be possible otherwise. 
Within the concept of institutional-based trust, institutions can be reconstructed as being 
functionally equivalent to a personal third party guarantor (Bachmann and Zaheer 2008). 
However, rather than interaction-based trust drawing on a third party as a person, institutional-
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based trust constitutively draws on impersonal arrangements Zucker 1986). Similar to a personal 
guarantor in the case of interaction-based trust, institutions help to establish a ‘world-in-
common’ (Garfinkel), i.e. shared explicit and tacit knowledge between the trustor and the trustee. 
In these circumstances, an individual or collective actor finds good reasons to trust another actor, 
individual or collective, because institutional arrangements are, like a personal third party 
guarantor, capable of reducing – which is not the same as eliminating! – the risk that a trustee 
will behave untrustworthily, allowing the trustor to actually make a leap of faith and invest trust 
in a relationship. 
 Institutional structures that can reduce the risk of misplaced trust may include, for 
example, legal regulations, professional codes of conduct that are or are not legally binding, 
corporate reputation, standards of employment contracts, and other formal and informal norms of 
behaviour. Institutions sometimes convey norms of behaviour that are deeply rooted in ancient 
traditions. For example, in the continental European business environment, and especially in 
Germany, the existence of active and powerful industry associations and the role they play in 
defining formal and informal norms of business behaviour have roots back into the Middle Ages 
and have been identified as being very conducive to developing institutional-based trust in inter-
organizational relationships (Lane and Bachmann 1996; Bachmann 2001). Institutional-based 
trust may generally be seen as a weaker form of trust compared to interaction-based trust, i.e. 
trust generated on the basis of intensive face-to-face contacts. However, it has considerable 
advantages with regard to the costs to generate it while, in a basic sense, institutional-based trust 
works quite similar to interaction-based trust. The elements of the institutional framework of a 
business system do their job in that they create shared explicit and tacit knowledge between the 
(potential) business partners, just as repeated face-to-face contacts would do. 
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What do (Organizational) Sociology Scholars Mean by Institutions? 
 
General Sociological Theory 
 
According to Giddens (1984), institutions are structural arrangements represented by rules of 
behaviour to which individual and collective action is oriented. Institutions create social order by 
providing patterns of behaviour used by actors to lend meaning and legitimacy to their 
behaviour. They can occur in the form of explicit rules and as implicit routines and practices. 
Institutions appear as formal institutional arrangements if they are based on explicit rules of 
behaviour. But they also include more context-specific informal rules, implied for example in the 
routines and practices of applying legal rules, teaching and learning styles, practices of financing 
investments, the use of industry associations’ resources by their members, or the usual forms of 
treating vulnerable and not so vulnerable suppliers. Informal routines and practices represent, 
like formal rules, very important institutional arrangements, especially when they acquire 
stability over a longer period of time and attain legitimacy through common acknowledgement.  
Institutions often appear detached from individual social actors’ preferences and 
intentions. This detachment makes them sometimes look like unalterable forces (‘faits sociaux’ 
in Durkheim’s (1895/1982) terminology) or natural laws. This can make them appear neutral 
with regard to single individuals’ socio-political interests and thus hard to challenge. However, 
neither formal institutional rules nor informal routines and practices are set in stone, as many 
critical social scientists have often pointed out (e.g. Hall 1986). Institutions represent the views 
of a large number of social actors that permanently confirm the validity and acceptability of 
these rules or routines and practices by the very concrete patterns of their interactions (Giddens 
1984). Thus, institutions can be changed by social actors, although this is a relatively rare 
phenomenon. To take an example from outside the sphere of business, marriage can be seen as a 
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good example of an important societal institution. Although it is possible that marriage could 
vanish as a form of long-term partnership between two individuals who establish a specific 
emotional bond and usually have children together, this could happen only if a large number of 
individuals continuously and radically question its legitimacy and/or usefulness.  
Institutions are relatively stable bundles of commonly accepted explicit or implicit rules 
of behaviour to which most people orient their behaviour. Irrespective of what a single actor may 
think about a specific institution, institutions create guidelines of behaviour that may 
occasionally be violated but cannot be ignored. Social order of any kind manifests itself in 
institutions (Parsons 1951) and even where old institutions are overthrown, new ones will 
emerge soon. At the same time, the strength of institutions can vary greatly between socio-
economic systems and the degree of the embeddeness of interactions in the given institutional 
arrangements (Granovetter 1985) is a variable that matters when specific empirical contexts are 
under review. Both the power of institutional arrangements and the depth of the embeddedness 
of inter-organizational exchanges are crucial with regard to the predictability and trustworthiness 
of individual or collective actors who envisage or build a business relationship.  
The Neo-institutionalist View 
The neo-intuitionalist approach in the socio-economic analysis of business relationships, which 
has flourished since the early 1990s, emphasizes institutional arrangements that both enable and 
restrict actors’ behaviour (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 1995; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
After about two decades of focusing on social change and individuals’ capabilities to express 
their needs and desires in the 1970s and 1980s, sociological theory in general and organization 
theory in particular became more interested (again) in social structures and institutional order. 
Since then, many scholars have slightly re-balanced their perspectives and tend to place more 
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weight (again) on institutional analyses that are geared to understanding not only the restrictions 
of social action but also the formative elements in social rules, routines and practices (Reed 
2001). Among neo-institutionalists’ key notions is what they call ‘institutional isomorphism’. 
This concept relates to the observation that organizational actors tend to exhibit very similar 
behaviours when being exposed to the same institutional environment (Di Maggio and Powell 
1983). Institutions, in their perspective, are generalized rules and patterns of behaviour that are 
engrained in all kinds of social interaction (Berger and Luckmann 1966). Similar to Giddens’ 
structuration theory, neo-institutionalists conceptualize trust as developed through the formal and 
informal patterns of behaviour. It can never exist in separation from them. Thus, any form of 
trust is essentially seen as institutional-based, following from collectively accepted norms and 
not from socially disembedded individuals’ rational (or indeed irrational) decisions. With respect 
to inter-organizational relationships, business environments are thus viewed as constitutive 
conditions of firms’ behaviour. 
 In our view, the neo-institutionalist approach provides important insights into the role of 
institutional-based trust in advanced socio-economic systems. However, we would maintain that 
there is also a way to develop trust by way of face-to-face contacts, the latter being not much, if 
at all, dependent on references made to the institutional arrangements that surround the 
interaction between trustor and trustee. Nonetheless, we share the neo-institutionalist view on 
institutional-based trust as a very important and basic form of trust (development). 
The National Business Systems Approach 
The literature on national business systems (Hall and Soskice 2001; Lane 1995; Sorge 1996; 
Whitley 1999; Haake 2002) shows less interest in abstract theoretical conceptualizations when 
analyzing institutional arrangements. In this body of literature, which largely also emerged in the 
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1990s, institutions are not just understood as general forms of social behaviour. Instead, a 
number of elements of the institutional framework of business systems are empirically identified 
(e.g. Whitley 1999) and different countries’ business systems are characterized by attributing 
country-specific variables to these categories. The quality of industrial relations, the system of 
vocational training and education, the legal system, and corporate governance practices are 
among those elements of the institutional frameworks of national business that are studied in 
detail in various countries. In this context, for example, the research on intellectual property 
rights (Andersen 2006) finds significant practical consequences of different national regulations 
and the literature on alternative firm ownership structures (e.g. La Porta et al. 1999) analyzes 
corporate and legal practices that explain differences in this respect across developed and 
developing countries.  
Looking at trust, the national business systems literature discerns high trust business 
systems and low trust business systems (Fukuyama 1995). Fox (1974), who focused on British 
and German industrial relations, was one of the first scholars to suggest such a conceptualization. 
In contrast to studies that see the differences between socio-economic systems predominantly 
rooted in culture, such as Triandis (1972), Hofstede (1991) or Trompenaars and Hamden-Turner 
(1997), the national business systems literature analyses institutional arrangements and the fit 
between institutional characteristics of business systems and organizational configurations. 
Different from many neo-institutionalist contributions to the debate, the national business 
systems literature provides strong empirical data, especially from a comparative perspective (e.g. 
Geppert, Matten and Williams 2002, or Casper and Whitley 2004 on the biotech industry). 
Through this approach valuable insights have been produced into the varieties of capitalism (Hall 
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and Soskice 2001) and the forms and country-specific conditions of trust development in inter-
organizational relationships (Lane and Bachmann 1996). 
No doubt: Institutions can be Important and Efficient Facilitators of Trust … 
Institutions can play a key role as facilitators of trust in that they produce shared ‘taken-for-
granted’ knowledge. Different from the utilitarian approaches to understanding trust, 
structuration theory, neo-institutionalist theory and the national business systems approach view 
trust as an embedded quality of social relationships. Institutions create common orientations and 
are capable of channeling interactions between two (or more) actors into foreseeable patterns, 
both by providing explicit rules incorporated in institutional arrangements and tacit knowledge 
embodied in routines and practices (Seligman 1997). Institutions bridge across knowledge 
domains and the decisions of individuals and organizations that otherwise would often not find 
any reason to trust a potential transaction partner. Institutional arrangements create familiarity 
and can lead to the suspension of critical questions about the actual trustworthiness of trustees. 
Both neo-institutionalist theory, with its roots in phenomenological philosophy (Husserl 
1929/1969), and the empirically based analyses of national business systems share this view.  
… but how do Institutions do Their Job Precisely?  
While the existing literature makes a very convincing case for the importance of institutions in 
the process of trust building in relationships between individual and collective actors, there is no 
clear understanding of how institutional arrangements precisely find their way into the decisions 
and actions of (potential) trustors and trustees. In other words, it is unclear what it precisely 
means when we say that institutional arrangements are a constitutive part of a relationship based 
on institutional trust and that trust is developed by references made to strong and reliable 
institutional arrangements in which a relationship is embedded.  
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To answer this question it is helpful to distinguish between three possibilities that exist 
with regard to how institutional arrangements might do their job. First, institutions may find 
access into potential trustors’ behaviour in that they lend meaning to the circumstances in which 
the actors are embedded before any relationship is built. This is to say that the actors’ 
behavioural antecedents can be influenced and thus lead to a (potential) trustor’s decision to 
invest trust in a relationship. For example, if a job applicant signals a strong background of 
professional education and institutions in the form of a reliable system of professional education 
can underpin this signal and thus attach credibility, meaning and relevance to such a signal, this 
can encourage a (potential) trustor, i.e. the (potential) employer, to suspend doubts and develop 
trust in the applicant’s professional competence. Second, the antecedent behaviour as observed 
from a potential trustor’s point of view might not be the direct target of institutional influences. 
Rather, institutions influence the patterns of how trustors and trustees interact when they start to 
actively establish a business relationship. If this is the case, institutions creep into the 
relationship in that they channel the behaviours of both parties and the patterns of their 
interaction. Institutions shape actors’ behaviours along the lines of institutionally provided 
templates. To use the same example again, a job interview might be done according to certain 
common routines created and underpinned by institutional arrangements, which could be 
guidelines issued by an industry association or recommendations and requirements that originate 
in the political and/or legal spheres. Then, it is not the antecedent behaviour but the actual 
patterns of building a specific relationship which are the target of the institutional influences. 
Third, a trustor has faith in the institutional arrangements themselves, making them the object of 
trust and by-passing the trustee as a free-willed actor who might or might not orient his or her 
behaviour towards a certain institutional order. This third possibility is, in our view, limited in its 
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theoretical capacity and less realistic, at least where business relationships are concerned. Above, 
we have already indicated that trust in institutions is not what we see as essential when we look 
at institutional-based trust in inter-organizational relationships. Thus, in the following we will 
only take two possibilities into account: institutions as targeting the behavioural antecedents to a 
(potential) trustor’s decision to either invest trust in a relationship or refrain from so doing (i); 
and institutions providing templates for interaction which either lead to a trust-based relationship 
or not (ii). 
 Whether possibility (i) or possibility (ii) holds true is theoretically difficult to decide. 
However, as our examples illustrate, there is no reason to assume mutual exclusiveness of both 
possibilities. Rather, it seems that institutions can and often do work both ways. Which of the 
two possibilities is more prominent in a certain situation is analytically important but can only be 
decided by way of empirical observation. Thus we want to move a bit closer to the empirical 
world now and see what are the concrete social mechanisms through which institutions do their 
job and the situations in which they matter the most with regard to building inter-organizational 
trust. 
 
Key Mechanism Through Which Institutions Foster the Development of Trust  
 
All social relationships involving trust are accompanied by an inherent risk: the trustor can never 
completely rule out the possibility of untrustworthy behaviour on part of the trustee. A central 
question associated with institutional-based trust is: what are the concrete mechanisms through 
which institutions do their job, allowing trusting managers and firms to deal with the risk of 
betrayal that unavoidably comes with the decision to invest trust in a relationship? In this section 
we systematically consider four concrete mechanisms through which institutions can specifically 
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reduce risk and foster trust building processes in inter-organizational relationships. These 
mechanisms are frequently named when (institutional) trust is referred to, for instance in the 
colourfully presented and already classic empirical examples which Coleman (1990: 91 ff) 
discusses. They explicitly or implicitly refer to all four mechanisms which we have selected here. 
What Coleman – like others – does not deliver, however, is a deeper understanding of how 
exactly institutions do their job. Viewing them simply as parameters in a mathematical equation, 
as Coleman does, is in our view certainly not a very enlightening approach. 
Legal Provision 
 
Everyday knowledge seems to suggest trust and legal provisions do not fit together very well. 
Equally, the tradition of socio-legal studies (going back to Macaulay 1963, and Beale and 
Dugdale 1975) puts this notion forward within an academic context. However, newer 
comparative empirical research shows that the existence of reliable contract law can actually be 
very conducive to developing trust in business relationships as relationships firmly based on 
legal rules can significantly lower the inherent risk of trust (Arrighetti et al. 1997). Law can be 
an effective risk reducing institution because it aligns actors’ expectations and behaviours long 
before any serious disagreement arises. It can also provide the possibility that the trustee faces 
serious sanctions if he or she does not live up to the trustor’s expectations. The latter, however, is 
only the ultima ratio which should normally not become relevant when law fulfils its function 
properly (Luhmann 1979). 
Consider the case of two organizations that have entered into a contractual relationship. 
There are no guarantees that these organizations will comply with the law. However, in socio-
economic systems with effective legal systems there is a high probability that the two parties will 
orient their behaviours to the existing formal legal rules. Usually, the relationship will function 
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without the trustor having to directly and explicitly resort to contract law or to threaten to 
mobilize the sanctions attached to law. If the trustor did this, these actions would surely get in 
the way of a productive business relationship. Law as a formal institution providing explicit rules 
of appropriate behaviour does its job best when it remains latent and both parties only vaguely 
consider the formal sanctions available if one side violates the agreement (Luhmann 1979). 
When disagreements result in legal action the law has failed to do its job efficiently because the 
sanctioning process is often costly, time consuming and it usually precludes the two parties from 
doing business with one another again in the future.  
In this context, it is interesting to note that some scholars see legal recourse via contracts 
rather than the law underpinning contract clauses as the pivotal institution in contractual 
relationships (Poppo and Zenger 2002). With regard to our understanding of institutions, which 
draws on sociological rather than economic theory, we do not agree with this argument. Only 
when the existence of a contract leads to behaviours outside the specific bonds of the contract, or 
a contract represents the existing legal norms, are contractual documents to be viewed as 
evidence of an institutional impact on the quality of the relationship. In this case, the legal 
contract is a tool that can be used to refer to the law, which in turn provides structural assurance 
that the other party will in all likelihood not behave opportunistically (unless there are strong 
external incentives to do so).  
Arrighetti et al. (1997) suggest that a contract can serve as a reassuring device that merely 
confirms what contract law requires from the contractors in a business situation. Admittedly, this 
is typically the case in business systems that build on the tradition of civil law, rather than 
common law, which means that the legal system builds on a powerful rule-based legal code. 
Regulation by means of legal norms features strongly in this type of business environment, 
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which is common in continental Europe and large parts of Asia. By contrast, common law, which 
is widespread in English-speaking countries, is based on sometimes difficult to find precedents 
and not on a set of clearly stated rules. It is thus relatively weak as an institution and contractors 
understandably fall back on their own – individually available – means to enforce or protect their 
interests whereby the contract (as such) can be an important tool. Common law systems usually 
leave more freedom as well as burden to the contractors to specify the nature of their relationship 
through their idiosyncratic contracts. The latter, however, is not necessarily very conducive to 
trust building, especially if the stronger side of two unequal partners is determined to maximize 
its interests.  
Civil law fosters the development of institutional-based trust as, if in doubt, the legal 
code has priority over idiosyncratic contract clauses, and thus often leads to inter-organizational 
relationships that are much more standardized and stable than under common law. Clearly, the 
effect on trust building can be stronger than in the common law system. However, even a 
common law system provides a significant level of commonly known and respected orientations 
as to what is acceptable business behaviour and what is not. Although to a lesser extent than civil 
law, common law – like any reliable legal system – makes actors’ behaviour more predictable 
and is thus an important mechanism to coordinate and control mutual expectations and to foster 
the development of trust, i.e. institutional-based trust, in business relationships. 
Legal provision in the form of contract law targets primarily the behavioural antecedents 
of trust building between a trustor and a trustee in that it aligns their expectations and behaviours 
before they actually engage in business transactions. (Long) before it actually comes to the 
process of shaping the specific relationship the law has – as a trust encouraging institution – 
already done most of its job in that it has oriented the antecedent expectations and behaviours of 
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both the (potential) trustor and the (potential) trustee to a common understanding of what are the 
basic premises of their relationship.  
Corporate Reputation 
Institutions can also have an informal character and incorporate social, rather than legal 
sanctioning power. Corporate reputation is an example of a mechanism that conveys informal 
behavioural norms. Similar to formal rules of business behaviour, such as those implied in legal 
regulation, an organization’s reputation channels behaviours of and towards the organization in 
certain directions, which in fact makes the future behaviour of the organization and their 
(potential) business partners more predictable. A firm’s reputation will influence the degree of 
attraction one has to affiliating with such an organization. Firms that value their reputation as 
social capital (Coleman 1990; Putnam 2002) will be unlikely to engage in practices that have the 
potential to damage that reputation and will thus be more predictable and trustworthy.  
What both legal arrangements (as a formal institutional mechanism) and reputation (as an 
informal institutional mechanism) have in common is that they can involve sanctions that might, 
even though this is only the exception, be activated against a cheating actor within the business 
community in which these institutions exist. In the case of reputation the sanction is its own 
erosion and subsequently the loss of business. Coleman (1988) discusses this deterrent 
possibility with regard to the Antwerp-based community of Jewish diamond dealers. Many more 
locally concentrated business communities could be found, and in fact, as bad and good news 
travel faster today than ever before in history, the reputation of large and small firms can quickly 
be ruined on a global scale. 
The mere fact that business partners know, often only very vaguely, that there might be 
some form of sanctions in the case of unaccepted behaviour, is the key to understanding the 
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sanctioning power of formal and informal institutions. They provide orientation and stability 
rather than explicit threats and deterrence, with not much difference between legal and informal 
sanctions in this respect. This is an important insight as to how these institutional mechanisms 
function with regard to building trust. They reduce the risk that a (potential) trustor misplaces 
trust and thus encourage him or her to actually invest trust in a relationship. 
Reputation can channel the meaning and interpretation of the behavioural patterns of trust 
building processes between two business partners. Different from legal provision, corporate 
reputation does not so much influence the antecedent behaviours of both parties but the routines 
and practices of relationship building activities. When one of the contractors signals a certain 
understanding or expectation in the contractual negotiations these signals gain their meaning in 
the light of the presence or absence of reputation. If, for example, a supplier firm with a 
reputation for high quality products or services signals to be flexible in terms of prices, this is 
likely to be contributing much more to establishing a long-term trust-based relationship than if a 
firm with a low reputation sends this signal. In the latter case this could easily be interpreted as a 
sign that the quality of products might be even lower than what one would normally expect from 
this firm, thus leaving the buyer firm in doubt about whether at all the product might be usable 
for his or her purposes. In these circumstances, the buyer may well refrain from trusting the 
seller. 
Certification of Exchange Partners 
The formal certification of an exchange partner is also a way through which institutions may do 
their job. Consider the guidelines and norms of good business practices created by societies of 
doctors, lawyers, accountants and other professionals, or indeed those of industry associations. 
Professional organizations, among other things, seek to promote behavioural norms among their 
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members that ensure compliance within a set of established rules. When, for example, an 
accountant is hired to perform an audit, access to financial data is required, the exposure of 
which could be harmful to a firm should it fall into a competitor’s hands. Clearly, trust is a vital 
issue in this context. Thus it is important to many clients that auditors who are CPAs (in the 
U.S.) or Chartered Accountants (in Canada and the U.K.) will have undergone extensive training 
and be certified by a governing body. 
Also, ISO 9000 certifications which are acknowledged worldwide, are a tool to 
standardize procedures of industrial and services sector firms in the interest of safety and quality 
of products and thus create institutional-based trust (Casper and Hancke 1999). Furthermore, 
national technical norms in the engineering sector (e.g. DIN-norms in Germany and BS-norms in 
the U.K.) ensure the comparability of parts that are outsourced (Lane 1997). All these 
standardization efforts are highly conducive to managing risk and to building trust among 
business partners. They make potential trustees’ behaviour more predictable as even if firms do 
not like specific technical standards, they are quite likely to comply with them. This is both 
because this behavioural option reduces complexity, simply making life and business easier, and 
because there might ultimately be severe sanctions, for example a serious decline of business on 
part of those ignoring industry-wide (technical) norms and standards.  
In the case of certifications the direct target of the institutional arrangements appears to 
be the antecedent behaviour of both parties to the business transaction. Similar to law, 
certifications do not gain so much relevance in the actual negotiation process which may lead to 
a trust-based relationship. Rather, they are influencing the antecedent expectations and behaviour 
of the trustor and the trustee (long) before decisions to trust or not to trust are made. 
Community Norms, Structures and Procedures 
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An institution establishes behavioural norms that exchange parties usually will orient their 
behaviour to, especially if they have limited knowledge about each other and long-winded face-
to-face trust building is not a desirable option. Within internet communities, for example eBay, 
users form opinions about whether and to what degree multiple buyers and sellers can be trusted 
and in doing so, make judgements about the community itself (Pavlou and Gefen 2004). 
Collecting information about many individual sellers who appear with multiple identities serves 
as a proxy for the overall trustworthiness of the seller community. Trust in such virtual 
communities is essentially impersonal and fairly informally based as it relates to generalized 
perceptions of the community and its ability to function in a manner that is consistent with 
members’ expectations. Such a community will build norms, structures and procedures regarding 
the behaviour of their members and thus make it function without any personal contacts.  
Online auctions and e-commerce in general have become an enormous business and the 
level of cheating is very low, both between individuals and organizations. The reason is that 
community norms, structures and procedures, such as those incorporated in systems to rate the 
reliability of potential business partners, provide a third-party guarantor function in the 
relationship between the trustor and the trustee. This allows for collective, i.e. legitimized, 
control of actors’ behaviours. Although rather informal and with no legal protection, norms, 
structures and procedures that are created internally in a business community make individual as 
well as collective behaviours more predictable and thus lower the inherent risk of trust. Actors, 
thus, are considerably more inclined to invest trust in a relationship than if such norms, structures 
and procedures were not in place. 
Here again, behavioural patterns that occur in the process of establishing a specific 
relationship rather than behavioural antecedents of decisions to invest trust in a relationship are 
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influenced by this mechanism. Within a business community behaviours of individuals are 
monitored, interpreted and sometimes, especially if the community is large, formally assessed in 
a quantified manner. Community norms, structures and procedures lend meaning to certain 
behaviours involving the interaction between trustors and trustees. If, for example, sellers on 
eBay are rated in terms of reliability, this is part of the routines and practices through which 
community norms, structure and procedures contribute to trust building processes. Thus, the 
primary target of these institutional forms is not the antecedent behaviour of sellers and 
customers but the patterns of interaction between the (potential) trustor and the (potential) 
trustee. Table 1 summarizes our argument with regard to the question of which mechanism 
primarily targets either the behavioural antecedents of a relationship or the patterns of interaction 
which evolve in the relationship in which trust is developed. Generally speaking, we find that 
formal institutions tend to influence the behavioural antecedents of relationships whereas 
informal institutions target the patterns of exchange-specific processes that are instrumental in 
building a trust-based relationship.  
********************** 
Insert Table 1 about here 
*********************** 
Common Management Situations: When do Institutions Matter most? 
 
As we have shown, institutions are often a vital source of trust in complex socio-economic 
systems. As indicated earlier, we do not assume that interaction-based trust, i.e. trust produced 
by face-to-face contacts, is negligible in differentiated modern socio-economic systems or that 
there are, besides trust, no other means to coordinate and control inter-organizational 
relationships. We believe, however, that there are specific situations where the influence of 
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institutions targeting either the behavioural antecedents of trust development or the patterns of 
interaction between the (potential) trustor and (potential) trustee can be particularly conducive to 
efficiently building trust in business relationships. 
After having examined the key mechanisms through which formal and informal 
institutions can help establish trust in business relationships, in this section we will now analyse 
situations where institutions matter most in the process of building trust in inter-organizational 
relationships. Typically, this is the case where interaction-based trust development is not a 
favourable option. At least four such situations can be clearly identified: in the early stages of the 
development of a trust-based relationship; when trust needs to be established swiftly; when the 
transaction involves a low level of asset specificity; and when transactions in mature industries 
are concerned. These situations are very common in the business world and thus frequently 
referred to but not analysed in depth anywhere in the literature. We do not claim that they are 
exhaustive or mutually exclusive. Despite the fact that there are many over-lapping cases in the 
empirical world it is, however, possible and useful to distinguish between these four situations.  
Trust in the Early Stages of a Relationship 
Institutions can be a specifically important factor in processes of trust creation where limited or 
no previous interaction exists between the (potential) trustor and the (potential) trustee. Consider 
what happens when a new joint venture is formed. At the formation stage, information about the 
partner firm and the managers involved in joint venture management will often be fuzzy and/or 
incomplete. Even if the partner firm and their managers are generally perceived as friendly and 
reliable, trust may be tentative between the involved managers as will be the relationship at the 
firm level. In this situation, institutional safeguards, such as those we have discussed above, e.g. 
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legal regulation can be very useful to encourage the boundary spanners in both firms to build a 
relationship on the basis of trust (Gulati 1995). 
Trust, as we argue throughout the paper, is not just a function of the idiosyncratic 
interests of actors; it is in many cases and in a fundamental sense a function of the nature of the 
institutional context in which relationships are embedded (Nooteboom 2002; Sheppard and 
Sherman 1998). A familiar context, as we have seen above, produces ‘taken-for granted’ 
assumptions and perceptions of safety, which can lead actors to place themselves at risk with 
other actors. Without these safeguards, managers and organizations would often be more focused 
on self-protection than mutual task performance (Sitkin 1995). Over time, when information 
about counterpart firms and managers becomes available, commonly shared knowledge 
embodied in the relevant institutional environment may have less influence on trusting behaviour 
whereas trust building on face-to-face experiences, i.e. interaction-based trust, may play a more 
pronounced role. Especially in the initial stages of the relationship, however, managers will be 
more likely to trust business partners when they know that reliable structural safeguards such as 
external legal arrangements or certification systems exist.  
This view is also confirmed by Mayer and Argyres (2004) who argue that in the early 
stages of a relationship contracts as such are often not a sufficient basis for trust building 
processes. Contracts have often limited detail because the parties have limited knowledge about 
each other and about the future dynamics of the exchange relationship. In this situation external 
safeguards are very important as they can reliably encourage a (potential) trustor’s willingness to 
engage in a trust-based relationship where not much is known about the exchange partner him- 
or herself. In the early stages of a business relationship the existence of such safeguarding 
institutions that do not require as much individual effort as this would be the case with 
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interaction-based trust building efforts playing a crucial role. Admittedly, establishing and 
maintaining institutional arrangements such as, for example, legal provision, the standardization 
of technical and behavioural norms or certification schemes etc., comes with costs that need to 
be paid for collectively and over time. However, at the point in time when they are needed 
institutional safeguards are costless for the parties involved in a specific situation and thus can be 
a very efficient way to produce trust, especially at the early stages of a relationship. 
In the early stages of a relationship it seems particularly important that those mechanisms 
which target the behavioural antecedents of trust come to the fore. Certification and legal 
regulation are most effective here. Reputation may also play some role in the early stages of a 
relationship. Less important are community norms, structures and procedures which only 
become relevant when business communities are small and relatively stable in terms of size. 
Thus we can say that simple and reliable safeguards which are highly generalized and exist 
independently from the individual relationship are most efficient when the initial stages of trust-
based relationship are concerned. This is also in line with Lewicki and Bunker (1996) who 
suggest that a (potential) trustor takes a relatively calculative approach in the early stages of 
relationship. Legal regulation and certification are perfect tools to influence a (potential) trustor’s 
relatively calculative antecedent assessment of the trustee’s trustworthiness.  
Swift Trust 
Where decisions need to be taken swiftly, which is not necessarily case in all early stages of 
business relationships, institutional-based trust is often indispensable. Business partners do not 
always have the time and energy to build trust-based relationships by way of repeated face-to-
face contacts, especially where one-off transactions are concerned (Barney and Hansen 1994) or 
special reasons for swift decisions exist, such as when a business chance is to be seized before 
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rivals become aware of it or where ‘hastily formed networks’ (Denning 2006) are unavoidable, 
for example in the case of health or safety related emergencies. Meyerson et al. (1996) are thus 
right to point out that ‘swift trust’ is frequently of the essence in business relationships. 
 Often a quick assessment of the situation and the business partner with some minimal 
amount of swiftly generated trust is a precondition of any (further leading) exchange taking place 
between two actors. If this basic form of trust rather than stronger forms of trust such as, for 
example, ‘identity-based trust’ (Lewicki and Bunker 1996) is to be created between the trustor 
and trustee, stable and commonly accepted institutional arrangements can often do a very 
efficient job. Without having to make lengthy checks and explicit considerations of whether to 
invest trust or not in a particular relationship, actors can fall back on institutional risk absorption 
provided, for example, through the certification of exchange partners, which in many situations 
is completely sufficient, especially where no close and long-term partnership is envisaged. 
  In cases where swift trust is needed, corporate reputation, even if not substantiated and 
confirmed by one’s own knowledge or experiences, can also make the difference between 
trusting and not trusting a (potential) business partner. Certification and reputation are most easy 
to grasp in such situations. A potential business partner is either certified or not and has a good 
or a bad reputation. The legal situation is a bit more difficult to swiftly assess in sufficient detail 
although it is here in principle also helpful to know that there are legal safeguards in place.  
Transactions Involving a Low Level of Asset Specificity 
 
The type of product or service exchanged in a business transaction also has an influence on the 
value of institutional-based trust. Barney and Hansen (1994) argue that trust is specifically 
important where sophisticated and customized products and services are concerned. The 
underlying assumption is that a relatively low level of asset specificity (Williamson 1985) 
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requires only a low level of trust and that developing high levels of trust developed on the basis 
of face-to-face contacts, i.e. interaction-based trust, might in such cases often be a waste of 
resources. In the case of a low degree of asset specificity, the value and quality of the assets 
relevant to a transaction can usually be easily assessed. Short and simple agreements are possible 
and a strong form of trust is often not needed in such cases. 
Institutional-based trust can, however, greatly enhance the efficiency of transactions 
involving low level asset specificity. Zucker’s (1986) argument that advanced socio-economic 
systems are highly dependent on institutional-based trust and cannot work solely on the basis of 
personal experiences (and ascribed group characteristics, for example the ethnic origin of 
business partners), is consistent with this part of our own argument. Too often transactions would 
simply not take place if strong but time-consuming forms of interaction-based trust developed in 
long-winded face-to-face interactions were always needed before any exchange is considered. 
Advanced complex business systems have to establish a form of trust production which can 
avoid hold-ups and excessive situational costs on part of the actors involved in a specific 
relationship. Institutional-based trust seems to be a tailor-made solution for markets on which 
products and services characterized by a low degree of asset specificity are exchanged. It may 
generally be a weaker form of trust but it comes with no, or at least no immediate or individually 
claimable, costs for the actors involved in a specific relationship while its quality may often be 
just good enough.  
In these circumstances, the reputation of a large and/or well-known player in the market 
can encourage a transaction partner to enter into a relationship with this firm without much 
hesitation. For transactions involving more sophisticated and difficult-to-evaluate assets, by 
contrast, a high degree of uncertainty tends to prevail and the establishment of relatively costly 
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interaction-based trust, i.e. trust developed in face-to-face contacts, may be worthwhile, 
especially where a longer-term relationship is envisaged between the two parties. But where this 
is not the case a good corporate reputation of the (potentially) trusted organization may well be 
sufficient to facilitate a mutually beneficial transaction. 
Legal safeguards and certification are also useful in such situations but these are not the 
primary mechanisms to establish institutional-based trust, especially where the trustees are large 
global players, which is often the case when a low level of asset specificity is characteristic of 
the exchanged product or service. If, for example, a specialist petrochemical firm uses Exxon or 
Shell as their supplier of a mass-produced input such as, for example glycols or polymers, this 
firm would usually simply rely on the reputation of the large multinational firm, rather than any 
form of certification or legal safeguards.  
Mature Industries 
The question of why particular industries are strongly developed in some countries and less so in 
others has, among other things, to do with the way trust is developed in specific business 
environments (Bachmann 2001). For example, continental Europe is not overly successful when 
it comes to high tech industries that require high levels of risk-taking on part of ambitious 
individuals. Where the latter is needed, strong forms of trust, i.e. interaction-based trust 
developed by repeated face-to-face contacts, can be much more effective than institutional-based 
trust, which, as we have seen in the case of transactions involving a low level of asset specificity, 
usually has a lower quality. High tech industries and the often knowledge intensive services 
sector, which are typically well developed in English-speaking countries, profit from an 
environment that supports high levels of interaction-based trust. By contrast, mature industries, 
which are more strongly developed in continental Europe, rely more on an environment where 
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institutional-based forms of trust flourish and are most efficient in absorbing an, on average, 
lower level of risk in relationships between individual and organizational actors.  
 It might be argued that the latter two situations are strongly overlapping as where mature 
industries are dominant one would often also expect low levels of asset specificity. However, we 
maintain that both situations are by no means congruent. Numerous cases exist where highly 
asset specific investments occur in relatively mature industries. This, for example, holds for 
many supplier relationships in the automobile industry, where costs are to be reduced by means 
of close and exclusive partnerships. 
 In the case of mature industries, community norms, structures and procedures are the 
primary institutional mechanisms to establish trust-based relationships. To a lesser extent, 
reputation and legal regulation also play a role. In large-scale mature industries the players are 
few and the markets tend to be relatively transparent. The in-group norms, structures and 
procedures are thus relatively strong. Certification, by contrast, is not an effective means to build 
trust in the large mature industries of continental Europe. Where this has been tried, adverse 
effects have been observed and certification can then actually be a source of distrust rather than 
trust (Walgenbach 2001). 
 
Mechanisms and Organizational Situations Combined: an Integrated Model 
 
The previous sections of this paper discussed four mechanisms by which formal and informal 
institutions specifically impact trust building processes and four organizational situations where 
the influence of institutions are most conducive to trust building in inter-organizational 
relationships. The following table now summarizes which of the four mechanisms feature(s) 
specifically strongly in which of the four situations. In viewing table 2 it is important to note that 
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each of the four mechanisms is associated with more than one of the four situations. On the basis 
of this insight, table 2 indicates one or two primary mechanisms per situation which reflect the 
most characteristic combinations, and one or two secondary mechanisms per situation which 
may also play a non-negligible role.  
************************************* 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
As depicted in this table, formal institutions, i.e. law and certification, are most important in the 
early stages of a business relationship and when swift trust is in demand. In both situations there 
is usually little knowledge available and a weaker form of trust would normally suffice for a 
(potential) trustor to take the first step. Here it is the antecedent expectations and behaviours that 
are formed by potential business partners vis-à-vis such conditions that matter. Reputation, as 
one form of an informal institutional structure, matters most with regard to swift trust 
development and situations where the products or services exchanged are characterized by a 
relatively low level of asset specificity. Community norms, structures and procedures are 
institutional arrangements which matter specifically in mature industries where the players are 
few, large and well-known. In this sector, for example in the steel or oil industries, key players 
tend to establish their own unwritten rules to organize their business. Both in the case of 
reputation and where community norms, structures and procedures are concerned, the primary 
target of these institutional facilitators of trust are the concrete patterns of interaction between a 
(potential) trustor and a (potential) trustee which channel the actors’ behaviours in certain forms, 
rather than antecedent expectations and behaviour which are relevant already before a specific 
relationship between two business partners is established.  
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Conclusion 
While the present paper presents a conceptual framework for research on institutional-based 
trust, we admit that the role of institutions in trust development is as yet not sufficiently 
researched, especially in empirical terms. Much effort is still needed to unravel the subtleties of 
empirical cases where institutional-based trust can make all the difference. For our future 
research, we believe that institutional-based trust should be seen as form of trust (development) 
which, in analytical terms, is different from interaction-based trust. We do not follow those 
scholars, such as Shapiro (1987), who may have an interest in impersonal forms of trust but are 
essentially very skeptical about the influence of institutions such as practice standards, and 
regulatory statutes on the behaviour of managers. In Shapiro’s view, the temptations to lie and 
steal continue to exist where strong institutions are in place. She concludes that ‘in complex 
societies in which agency relationships are indispensable, opportunities for agent abuse are 
sometimes irresistible and the ability to specify and enforce substantive norms governing the 
outcomes of agency is nearly impossible, a spiraling evolution of procedural norms, structural 
constraints, and insurance-like arrangements seems inevitable’ (Shapiro 1987: 649). In other 
words, in her view institutions alone are insufficient for the existence of trustworthy transactions 
and must at least be supplemented by a host of additional controls. Our view is that depending on 
the situation in which trust is required, institutions can matter a great deal. Although these may 
produce a form of trust which is weaker than interaction-based trust, i.e. trust developed over a 
period of time by face-to-face contacts, institutions shape and channel actors’ expectations so as 
to allow for trust building in many situations where otherwise there would be none. 
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In this article, we discussed four mechanisms through which institutions particularly 
influence trust development processes. We also discerned four specific situations where the 
influence of institutions can be particularly conducive to building trust in business relationships. 
In examining these mechanisms and situations, we believe we have made a persuasive case as to 
why institutions should play a more prominent role in the study of inter-organizational trust. Not 
least with regard to the urgent issue of trust repair we think that institutional arrangements will 
have to play an essential role as trust based face-to-face contacts alone would not necessarily 
lead the way out of the current trust crisis and are also in many cases not feasible and often far 
too costly.  
The primary target of institutional influences is, in our view, key to understanding 
institutional-based trust. Future research should thus seek to understand and, on the basis of 
empirical studies, differentiate situations where institutions directly influence actors to develop 
trust in inter-organizational collaborations from those where institutions only vaguely encourage 
or discourage actors to consider institutional-based trust, and those where actors deliberately 
make their decisions primarily on the basis of other organizing principles, for example, power. 
To address these issues, empirical research will need to isolate specific managerial situations and 
examine the very concrete circumstances around transactions, relationships, and institutions. For 
example, the propensity to use joint ventures versus acquisitions could provide insights into the 
strength of institutions. Wang and Zajac (2007) examined the costs and benefits of alliances and 
acquisitions and suggested that organizations with previous alliance experience may have 
developed a trusting relationship and might be more likely to prefer a long-term partnership over 
an acquisition in the future. To test for the role of institutions researchers could look at the 
attractiveness of alliances in the light of experiences that both parties made with one another in 
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prior relationships. The question could be examined using cross-border data from countries with 
strong and weak institutional frameworks. According to our view the chance that alliances are 
formed in the absence of prior experiences in close inter-firm relationships should be higher in 
the country with stronger legal and social institutions. Acquisitions would likely be more 
prevalent when institutions are weak, given that future interactions in an acquisition occurs under 
one owner and eliminate the threat of partner opportunistic behaviour. Experimental scenarios 
could provide interesting avenues for the examination of contracting behaviour and situations, 
for example, where trust is developed in initial stages of relationships or where the level of the 
asset specificity of exchanged products or services is specifically low or specifically high. 
Extensive empirical research is needed to show whether our conceptual framework helps to fully 
understand why and how institutions matter, where institutional-trust can stand in for interaction-
based trust and vice versa. Especially in times when trust is a scarce resource while needed more 
than ever, these questions are urgent. As we are moving out of the global financial crisis into a 
new era of post-liberal capitalism, this will be one of the most important fields in management 
research. The repair of trust will to large extent build on institutional measures and involve a 
substantial degree of re-regulation after almost three decades of de-regulation. That moralistic 
appeals will do the job and contribute much to overcoming the trust crisis seems a quite 
unrealistic hope.  
 
 
Note: We owe thanks to Frank den Hond and three anonymous reviewers for their extremely 
helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. 
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